



The Logic of Pan-securitization: A Investigation of the EU's Resilience Construction Policy

Zhang Tao, Huang Dengxue

Shandong University, Qingdao, China

*Corresponding Author: Zhang Tao, Shandong University, Qingdao, China

ARTICLE INFO	ABSTRACT
 <p>Received: 19 Mar 2025 Accepted: 28 Mar 2025 Published: 14 Apr 2025</p>	<p>The Resilience Building Policy (RBP) of the European Union is in the alienation stage of Pan-securitization. Until 2020, EU's RBP is based on risk response to address national vulnerabilities. However, after the EU thought about economic issues from the perspective of security, its RBP began to Pan-securitization alienation, and the de-risking policies is a typical representative of this alienation. The construction of Pan-securitization has the following three continuous mechanisms: 1. Narrative Construction; 2. Agenda Setting; 3. Policy Expansion. Based on this theoretical framework, we can find that EU's conflictual narrative has shaped the policy consensus for the de-risking policies. On this basis, relevant the EU actors strive to promote the de-risking agenda into the policy process and become policy outcome; Finally, policy diffusion both inside and outside of the EU further promotes the implementation of de-risking policies. Overall, a shift from risk-based to threat-based Pan-securitization resilience building is practically difficult to achieve its policy objectives.</p>
<p>Cite this article as:</p> <p>Tao, Z., & Dengxue, H. (2025). The Logic of Pan-securitization: A Investigation of the EU's Resilience Construction Policy. <i>International Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Studies</i>, 12(2), 1-9.</p> <p>DOI: https://doi.org/10.62557/2394-6296.120201</p>	<p>KEYWORDS: <i>Resilience Construction, European Union, De-risking, Pan-securitization.</i></p>
<p>Copyright: © 2025 The author(s). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License.</p> 	

INTRODUCTION

“Resilience” first appeared in Engineering to refer to a material’s ability to bounce back after an external shock, and was later borrowed from various disciplines. In the field of Ecology and Environmental Science, resilience refers to the stable and balanced state of the ecosystem in the face of external shocks; in the field of Psychology, it means the ability of the human heart to withstand mental stress and the ability to restore normal; in the field of Public Policy, it means the ability of the city or community to cope with and respond to risks. (Bourbeau, 2018) International Relations mainly draws on the understanding of resilience in Public Policy, and regards it as the practice of countries, international organizations or the international community to take measures to improve their resilience in response to risks. RBP refers to an important means for countries to make up for national vulnerability and reduce losses in an uncertain world. For example, some scholars have proposed that the international community should increase investment in the field of climate change and enhance the resilience of all aspects of the international community in order to cope with the future climate crisis. (Martinez-Diaz, 2018) Over

the years, the EU has placed particular emphasis on enhancing its own resilience and made it as a key objective of its foreign policy. In European Union Global Strategy and 2020 Strategic Foresight Report, the EU has made resilience one of its core policy objectives and proposed to build a more resilient Europe. The EU uses the principle of resilience to integrate the implementation of foreign policy in order to respond to a complex and changing policy environment. (Tocci, 2020)

In other words, RBP is a series of policies and actions taken to improve the ability of resisting risks. However, risks are always present, cannot be fully predicted and avoided, and there is no subjective threat source should be blamed. In this regard, RBP is essentially a defensive approach and action. However, since the EU put forward the concept of de-risking, the EU’s RBP has changed. De-risking has become the core concern of the EU’s foreign policy, and resilience building has begun to lose the original meaning of resilience policy, which is risk-based. Now it is threat-based. The EU believes that its strategic environment has changed, and the threats and challenges EU faced are direct and clear. Based on this, EU’s RBP has entered a stage of Pan-securitization, from a defensive

and preventive policy orientation to an offensive and proactive orientation.

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF PAN-SECURITIZATION

The existing theory literature mainly focuses on securitization, and rarely deals with Pan-securitization. Before putting forward the theoretical framework of this paper, it is necessary to distinguish the concepts of securitization and Pan-securitization and their relationships. Securitization refers to the process by which securitization actors use the rhetoric of existential threats to remove an issue from everyday politics. (Buzan et al., 1998) Pan-securitization refers to securitize of non-security issues, traditionalize the non-traditional security, and excessively expansion of the field, boundary, scope and subject of security, resulting in national security becoming an all-encompassing and all-inclusive field. Securitization and Pan-securitization are essentially the same, both of which incorporate a common issue into security considerations through a series of political operations. But the difference between the two is also obvious, the biggest difference is the nature of the issue areas is different, and the process is different. Specifically, securitization refers to the inclusion of issues that originally have security attributes but have not been noticed into security considerations. Pan-securitization refers to the inclusion of issues without security attributes into security considerations. In the process of Pan-securitization, agencies need to justify their unconventional actions, argue that extraordinary actions are necessary and justified, and extend security policy to non-security issues.

Securitization theory originated in the 1980s, mainly established by the Copenhagen School, which understood securitization as the linguistic construction of security problems. Since then, securitization research has basically evolved along this understanding. Security is both a state and a capability. As a state, security is freedom from external threats, intimidation and danger; as a capability, security is the ability to defend oneself in the face of such threats at a reasonable cost. (Miller, 2001) The particularity of security lies in its importance, it is "the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization". (Buzan et al., 1998) The emergence of Pan-securitization is the normalization of security caused by securitization. The normalization of security seriously weakens the sense of security of actors and inevitably leads to Pan-securitization. To some extent, the emergence of security problems is the product of conscious social practice in human society, and securitization is the result of social construction. Security problem is not a natural objective fact, but a "political choice" or "social construction"

generated by social subjects in response to specific threats. In essence, specific issues are passively generated into security issues in the social process. (Williams, 2003) Therefore, security problems are the inter-subject consensus in a specific time and situation, and are the result of the subjective construction of the actors.

In the process of securitization, language and practice play important roles. On the one hand, according to the "Copenhagen School", the essence of the securitization process is linguistic behavior. Securitization refers to "the process of presenting events through security terms or vocabulary, that is, the way to study security is to study the discourse and 'political ecology', when the rhetoric with a specific rhetorical and symbolic structure can achieve sufficient effect to persuade concerns about tolerance or must obey these rules". (Buzan, Hansen, 2009) Therefore, when an actor gives urgency and harm to a certain threat through rhetoric, he completes the securitization of the specific threat and has the legitimacy to deal with the threat. On the other hand, the "Paris School" turns the focus of securitization to government technology on the basis of criticism, arguing that securitization is not only a rhetorical expression, but also can be achieved by designing different technical and physical ways. The driving force of securitization in practice comes from the expanding trend of insecurity filed. The insecure domain has a tendency to conquer other domains and incorporate them into the logic of insecurity, and "insecure professionals" redefine the domain's internal security and external security, constantly asking new questions and examining and dealing with them in the context of security. (Bigo, 2002)

Based on the theory of securitization, the arise of Pan-securitization mainly driven by the logical of language and the logical of practice. So this paper holds that the construction of Pan-securitization has the following three continuous mechanisms: 1. Narrative Construction; 2. Agenda Setting; 3. Policy Expansion.

Narrative Construction

In the social life, discourse plays a vital role in social construction. Poststructuralism takes language as its ontological hypothesis, and holds that the social world is essentially "text", and the world can be understood and described through the formal interpretation of text. (Debrix, 2003) Along with this understanding, more and more attention is paid to the social construction and meaning generation functions of language. Austin put forward the proposition that speech itself is a kind of action, and held that language is not only a way of expressing the objective world, but also a practice of changing social facts. Speaking is doing something. (Austin, 1962) For example, a nation country can constructs its identity, meaning and policy legitimacy through discourse, and the action of language plays the most important role at this time. The construction of

national identity is mainly realized through relevance and difference, and national identity is connected, changing and diverse, and such change is realized through language. (Kouhpaenejad et al., 2014) The role of political rhetoric in policy decision-making has also received attention. Rhetoric “may intersperse technical and scientific arguments with more generally accessible narratives that fit together the specialists’ arguments with accounts of events, emblematic cases, and even doomsday scenarios to generate compelling stories about the causes of current problems, what needs to be done to remedy them, and how they fit with the underlying values of the society”. (Schmid, 2008)

Narrative plays a crucial role in the process of threat construction. The characteristics of narrative, such as plot design, characters shaping, causal attribution etc., can enable securitization initiators to more effectively persuade audience, construct rationality and legitimacy, and complete discourse mobilization, thus forming policy consensus among policy audiences and laying the foundation for the subsequent securitization process. In the process of discourse mobilization, the use of narrative strategy is an important factor affecting the success or failure of mobilization. Controlling the scope of conflict, angel/demon transfer, and the use of causal mechanisms are the most common and effective narrative strategies. First, expanding the scope of conflict in the narrative can provoke conflict, create antagonism, and achieve the purpose of changing the policy status quo; Secondly, the demon transfer can make the policy target incarnate and exaggerate the threat degree of the target. Third, causal mechanism is a powerful strategy for attributing responsibility, and telling targeted causal stories can effectively form consensus. (Shanahan et al., 2018) Through the construction of policy discourse, urgent and realistic threats showed to the audience, so, it is necessary to take measures against them.

Agenda Setting

After the policy consensus is formed, how to make the policy representing the consensus enter the policy process and form the policy outcome through effective agenda setting becomes the key to securitization. Agenda-setting theory first appeared in the field of journalism and communication “to explain the impact of mass media on public perception, that is, media telling the public what to think”. (Park, 1940) Later, the theory of agenda setting was introduced into the field of public policy, and the important role of agenda setting in the process of decision making began to be paid attention to, and what kind of policy agenda and how to enter the policy process became research priorities. International political agenda setting means a country sets dialogue topics to other countries on the problem areas existing with other countries, so as to obtain the right to speak on the topic and the leading

right to act. In world politics, agenda setting and the control to agenda are crucial, which is the primary tool for acquiring and extending power (Livingston, 1992) Successful agenda setting can enlarge the scale of issues, show their views, seek advantages. It is one of the sources of state power.

Agenda setting plays an important role in the process of securitization. Securitization initiators embedding the security agenda into the policy process through various methods is a key part of the formation of security policy. The power advantage, the urgency and universality of the problem, and the propagation of the issue are the keys to the success of the agenda setting. Power advantage is mainly reflected in whether it has or is close to the agenda entry point, which is a place or location that can construct problems that attract other actors. In international relations, major agenda entry points include global knowledge production sites, transnational networks and media, key international organizations or mechanisms, international conferences or alliances, and other diplomatic activities. Successful agenda-setting requires actors to have or be able to use these entry points.(Steven, 1992) It is easy to understand the urgency and universality of the problem, and the more stakeholders and interests involved, the more easy it is to reach consensus and form policies. Besides, agenda communication mainly involves the interaction between the framework of the messenger and the recipient. When the two can reach an agreement, the agenda will be successfully embedded. When the two frameworks are inconsistent or even in conflict, the agenda setting will either be unclear or fail. (Scheufele, 2000)

Policy Expansion

Another important approach to securitization is to design the technical policy application. The “field of practices” and *dispositif* are important concepts for understanding practice-centered securitization. In a field of practice, distinguishing actors can be achieved not only by their nature, but also by their status and amount of capital in relation to each other. In a security domain, the members of the domain share a set of interests, a common and unique way of generating knowledge, and a common strategy for solving problems. Therefore, the field produces the practice system. (Balzacq T et al., 2016) At this time, the content and form of security practice are expressed by the power relations of a practice field. *Dispositif* is a heterogeneous composed of a variety of elements, such as discourse, institutions, structural forms, laws, administrative measures, philosophy, morality, etc., which itself establishes relations among these factors.(Foucault, 1980) Through the policy operation, there will be a mutual constitutive relationship between the practice field and the disposal to promote the realization of security. In a word, policy expansion considers “the characteristic techniques, instrumentalities

and mechanisms through which practices unfold". (Dean, 2010)

The transformation of an insecure problem domain into a secure one is often an extension of the security domain. A practice area that has completed security extends to the non-security field through administrative techniques, laws and norms, so that a non-security problem can be re-examined from the perspective of security. Securitization begins. Since security is very important in political life, which is over all other politics considers. So, once a non-security issue is examined by the security prism, securitization will be inevitable. At the same time, the knowledge of "insecure professionals" will also play an important role in the security process. "Insecure professionals" have accumulated unique knowledge and capital in the past process of securitization, which makes them obtain the scientific legitimacy of this field, and this legitimacy will make the knowledge generated by them in other fields also have legitimacy. The securitization of non-security fields will be successfully realized under the leadership of "insecure professionals". (Balzacq T et al., 2016)

PAN-SECURITIZATION OF EU'S RESILIENCE BUILDING POLICY

The EU attaches great importance to enhancing its resilience in its policy planning, and has always taken improving resilience as its policy goal to improve the EU's ability to cope with risks and reduce its vulnerability. In 2020 Strategic Foresight Report, EU has set its policy goal to build a more resilient Europe, and has proposed to strengthen its risk response capacity in four aspects: the social and economic dimension, the geopolitical dimension, the green dimension and the digital dimension. The EU's resilience building during this period was mainly based on risk response, aiming to overcome various risks and challenges it may faced. In European Economic Security Strategy published in 2023, however, the EU has concretized the risks it faces, believing that geopolitics, hostile economic actions and other factors have exposed the vulnerability of the EU, and the EU must implement de-risking policies to enhance its resilience and competitiveness. This shows that the EU has moved from risk-based resilience building to threat-based resilience building. The EU's RBP has thus entered the stage of Pan-securitization.

EU'S ECONOMIC SECURITY NARRATIVE

Narrative discourse mobilization is the starting point and key to promoting Pan-securitization. Only after gaining recognition and establishing policy consensus through narrative can setting agenda and expanding policy easily. When putting forward its own economic security strategy, the EU has fully discussed the background, reasons and responsibility of the implementation of the

de-risking policy, with the intention of demonstrating the importance and necessity of promoting the economic security strategy and legitimizing it. The EU's economic security narrative can be read in two ways, one is the design of narrative form, another is the application of the narrative strategies.

In terms of narrative form, EU constructs a policy background that is in a critical period of historical transformation. On the one hand, the net-zero transformation constitutes the most important transformation of the time, one that will shape the economy and industry of the future. Speaking at The World Economic Forum in 2023, von der Leyen said: "The net-zero transformation, the most rapid and far-reaching in history, has brought about enormous industrial, economic and geopolitical transformations that are changing the nature of work and the shape of industry." A rapidly changing world presents unprecedented opportunities and challenges. The EU believes that Europe's future will depend on the actions it takes now. The greatest industrial transformation in history will bring huge economic benefits. Countries around the world, including China, are striving to gain this competitive advantage, and the EU must respond to these actions in a timely and effective manner in order to gain an advantage in the change. But China has achieved considerable advantages, and China continues to maintain and expand its advantages. The EU needs to maintain economic ties with China, but promote a level playing field and deal with all unfair practices encountered by the EU. On the other hand, the power transfer has led to intensified competition among great powers, the geopolitical risk of the European Union has greatly increased. The EU believes that the shift in the balance of power from Russia to China gives China an opportunity to exert influence over Russia, and that China and Russia are jointly seeking a new international order based on coercion and control. Europe is facing geopolitical pressure from China and Russia, which constitutes the geopolitical environment of the EU.

Secondly, the EU shaped the character of China as a revisionist. In the EU's narrative, China is the main narrative player, and they believe that China has a strong will to change the existing international order, and that an increasingly powerful China is increasingly able to achieve this goal. EU believed that current China is no longer open, China is seeking control at home and abroad, and security has become a priority for China. Free markets and open trade have given way to security and control, as China seeks economic control at home and the world's dependence on China abroad. This shift is due to China's desire to focus its efforts on building a China-centered international order. It's effort reflected in its actions to establish multilateral institutions, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the New Development Bank,

and others, as a counterweight to the existing international system. At the same time, China wants to portray itself as a broker of power and peace, which is reflected in its promotion of the rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia and its display of a special relationship with Russia. Europe, as the champion of liberal democracy, needs to work with its partners to show that its democratic institutions, values, and open economies can bring security and prosperity to the people of the world.

Thirdly, the EU has engineered a plot in which China forcibly changes the international order, while the EU responsibly manages its relations with China. A powerful China wants to have leading influence in the world, wants to be the most powerful country in the world, and chooses tough ways to advance these goals. On the issue of the Russia-Ukraine war, China did not choose to stay away from Russia, but continued to insist on developing "unlimited" bilateral relations with Russia, which undermined the realization of a just peace. In its neighborhood diplomacy, China has taken a more assertive stance, flexing its military muscle in the South China Sea, East China Sea and on its border with India, which detracts from the legitimate interests of European's partners. In the economic sphere, China pursues a policy of trade coercion to ensure compliance by other countries and imposes sanctions on those who do not comply with China. China deliberately uses dependence and economic clout to ensure that it can benefit from smaller countries. In the face of an increasingly assertive China, the EU will manage its relationship with the EU responsibly. Although the relationship has become estranged and difficult due to China's behavior, the EU still views the relationship rationally. On global issues such as trade, finance and climate, China and the EU can still cooperate, which provides room for the two sides to enhance their relationship. And on issues of major concern, the EU will engage in frank exchanges with China to make the competition more orderly and fair.

Finally, about narrative moral, de-risking policies are necessary. As mentioned before, the relationship between China and the EU is not black and white, there is still room for cooperation on many issues, and the EU is also pleased to see China playing a positive role in such areas as climate change and environmental protection. But at the same time, the challenge posed by China is immediate and urgent. Europe needs to coordinate with China to build a healthy system of competition and cooperation. Europe cannot treat China in a black-and-white way, and decoupling from China is not in Europe's interest. In its relations with China, Europe should focus on reducing risks and managing key issues in the relationship through diplomacy.

In terms of narrative strategy, the EU mainly uses the strategy of expanding the scope of conflict and

constructing causal attribution. On the one hand, in its economic security narrative, the EU regards a wider range of economic ties as threats that may endanger national security, thus incorporating many ties generated under normal economic activities into security considerations, and the trend of Pan-securitization construction of economic resilience is significant. For example, the EU believes that the current economic globalization has given rise to a high degree of economic integration. In the past, this connection was considered benign and could promote economic development. But under the situation of geopolitical tension, this connection has changed from benign to threatening cognition, believing that it will pose a direct threat to the EU's trade, economic and social operation. In particular, the use of a large number of emerging technologies blurs the line between civilian and military use, posing risks that can quickly evolve into national security issues. Therefore, the EU needs comprehensive regulation of new key technologies.

The EU, on the other hand, uses a causal narrative to blame China for the deteriorating status quo. The EU believes that the deterioration of relations between China and the EU and the emergence of unfair economic competition are caused by China. With regard to China-EU relations, the EU believes that China's increasingly assertive behavior and ambition to change the international order have made China-EU relations increasingly distant and difficult, especially China's position on the Russia-Ukraine issue. As for unfair competition, China gives its own enterprises large-scale subsidies, restricts EU enterprises' access to the Chinese market, and takes advantage of other countries' economic dependence on China to gain unfair competitive advantages, which seriously harms the economic interests of the EU. In addition, China has encouraged all or part of the energy industry in Europe and elsewhere to move out in order to obtain cheap energy and avoid regulatory risks, which has changed the layout of global energy industry capacity and helped China gain an unequal advantage. The EU needs to deal with China's unfair competition calmly and manage the risks in its relationship on the basis of thorough investigations.

SETTING THE DE-RISKING AGENDA

After constructing the rationality and legitimacy of the EU's de-risking policies through narrative, the EU then incorporated the de-risking policies into the policy process through policy agenda setting to realize the landing of de-risking from concept to policy. After von der Leyen put forward the concept of de-risking, the EU quickly launched a discussion on this issue, whether at the official level or the social level. The rationality and necessity of de-risking policies have been repeatedly discussed, and it has naturally entered the policy formulation process and reflected in European Economic

Security Strategy. In this process, the US factor and the EU's description framework of de-risking policies played key roles.

Since the concept of de-risking was proposed on January 17, 2023, relevant actors in the EU have had repeated discussions around the concept, especially focusing on the urgency for de-risking policies, which effectively promote the de-risking agenda into the policy decision-making process. For example, on January 30, 2023, European Economic Commissioner Paolo Gentiloni gave a speech at the Hertie School in Berlin, arguing that Europe's competitiveness is being challenged by three factors: high energy prices, industrial policies of other countries and access to key raw materials and technologies. In the face of a changing world and the emergence of new challenges, the EU must implement a new industrial policy, get rid of its dependence on China's industrial chain, and attract industries from all over the world to Europe, and Europe cannot outsource its industry to China. To stress the importance of implementing the new Industrial policy to protect the economic security of Europe. Some members of the European Parliament believe that Europe is currently facing multiple challenges, Europe must respond quickly, the most critical of which is to develop a plan to lead the clean technology industrial revolution, which is crucial to improve the resilience and competitiveness of the European economy. The excessive dependence on the other countries is an important issue that Europe urgently needs to solve. At the social level, on 22 March 2023, European leaders and the leaders of the European Social partners will discuss Europe's competitiveness challenges and how to make Europe a place for industrial investment, growth and quality jobs at the Tripartite Social Summit. Among them, the establishment of a level playing field, the establishment of a new trade agenda, the strengthening of the skills agenda and other issues received particular attention. Leaders stressing that in order to re-establish Europe's leading competitiveness, further new measures must be taken in various aspects. After a long period of demonstration and promotion, the new de-risking economic policy has entered the policy process and become an important issue of the European Commission. These issues of energy, emerging technologies, dangerous dependencies, and European competitiveness, under the concept of de-risking eventually converge into the main elements of Europe's new economic security strategy. On June 20, 2023, the European Commission issued the European Economic Security Strategy, which introduced the economic risks faced by the EU and the possible policy tools, and de-risking was officially transformed from a discourse concept into a policy practice in Europe.

The successful realization of this transformation is mainly due to the power advantage of the issue advocates, the urgency of the issue and the close correlation with the

existing issue. First, the push is top-down. The proposer of the concept of de-risking policy, European Commission President von der Leyen, as the top leader of the EU executive department, has the power to decide the Commission's policy agenda and legislative proposals. In addition, many EU leaders and Members of the European Parliament, including the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the European Union, have also endorsed the de-risking policies. All of this sets the stage for the issue to enter the policy decision-making process.

Secondly, the success of the de-risking agenda in producing policy outcomes is also a result of the narrative framework of the agenda's advocates. When describing the implementation of the de-risking policies in Europe, relevant actors stressed the seriousness and urgency of the challenges facing the EU. In arguing for her new economic security policy, von der Leyen argued that while strengthening its military posture, China has also strengthened its disinformation policy and economic coercion policy, which has brought serious challenges to the political security and economic security of the EU, and the problem of unfair competition between China and the EU must be addressed. The EU needs a transparent, fair and reciprocal relationship with China. By describing the urgency of the issue, the issue gained strong attention and support, and thus was able to enter the policy process.

Finally, the correlation between de-risking and existing issues is an important reason for its success. Specifically, by associating the issue of de-risking with the Russia-Ukraine war and China's assertiveness, the issue's advocates have gained enormous legitimacy. The outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war brought a severe geopolitical crisis and energy crisis to Europe, which was exacerbated by Russia's use of European energy dependence. Therefore, the issue of the weaponization of interdependence became a sensitive nerve in Europe. When promoting the de-risking policies, EU leaders have repeatedly mentioned the huge crisis brought by the Russia-Ukraine war to Europe, while reminding Europe to avoid being hurt again because of its dependence on China. At the same time, the prevailing China power theory also casts a shadow on the dependency relationship between China and Europe. They discuss the danger of dependence on China by stating that China is no longer an open and free China. An increasingly powerful China, both internally and externally, will use other countries' dependence on China to force others to conform to China, and Europe will also become the target of economic coercion if its unjust relationship with China is not changed.

SECURITY POLICY EXPANSION

The implementation of security policy is the purpose of securitization, so policy expansion is the last step in the Pan-securitization of the EU's RBP. After de-risking

became the core tenor of the European economic security strategy, relevant policy measures were immediately promoted, and existing policies began to shift to de-risking. This kind of policy expansion is mainly carried out from the internal and external dimensions of the EU. In the internal, new policies and policy shifts are implemented. Externally, the relevant decoupling policy of the United States, based on the background of Euro-American coordination, was also soon extended to Europe. European Economic Security Strategy provides an analysis of the threats and challenges facing the EU and sets out feasible policy instruments for the EU. This laid the foundation for the EU to implement the relevant policies.

Within Europe, the EU mainly promotes the de-risking policies through various economic and trade laws. Since the release of the European Economic Security Strategy, the EU has promoted a series of economic and trade bills in a short period of time. These include the EU Chips Act, The Critical Raw Materials Act, Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive the Diligence Directive, the Net-Zero Industry Act, and the Anti-subsidy and Anti-dumping instruments, to contain the economic risks facing the EU. Taking the introduction of The Critical Raw Materials Act as an example, from the bill proposed by the European Commission in March 2023, approved by the European Parliament in December, to the approval of the Council of the European Union in March 2024, the entire legislative process takes only about a year, which reflects the strong will of the EU to get rid of dependence and promote the de-risking policies.

In January 2024, the European Commission launched the "European economic security Package", Five new initiatives to strengthen European economic security: an introduction to five new initiatives, which provides a detailed description of the policies that can be implemented to de-risking. First, improve and update existing policies. The introduction of a new Screening bill, based on the existing FDI Screening Regulation, to enable EU monitoring bodies to more effectively screen foreign investments, thereby strengthening the EU's ability to protect its own economic security and public order. Secondly, the publication of a White Paper on Export Controls to strengthen the EU's ability to control specific technologies internationally. The White paper aims to ensure the effectiveness of EU export controls and the integrity of the market under the multilateral regulatory regime. Finally, in response to the current failure to regularize, the Commission recommends supporting and empowering higher education institutions and other public/private research institutions across Europe to identify and address security risks. In short, through the layout of EU institutions in the field of trade and investment, the policies has been rapidly promoted and implemented, and de-risking is becoming more and more legalized in the EU.

Outside Europe, the coordination between Europe and the United States has greatly promoted the realization of the de-risking policies. Since the concept of de-risking is an alternative to the "decoupling" of the United States, the de-risking policies of the European Union has drawn on the decoupling policy of the United States in many places in terms of policy forms. The decoupling policy of the United States towards China is mainly reflected in the imposition of tariffs, export control, investment review, supply chain review, high-tech decoupling, etc. The de-risking policies of the European Union is also mainly laid out in these aspects, and the economic and trade policies of Europe and the United States towards China show a high degree of similarity. The formulation of EU's de-risking policies is mainly influenced and inspired by the decoupling policy of the United States. On the issue of 5G, Europe has followed the pace of the United States, excluding China's 5G from the European market on the grounds of national security. On the issue of export controls, Europe is also working on The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Good and good Technologies to impose export controls on China, impeding China's access to advanced equipment and technology. The US policies of decoupling has been accepted by Europe, so the EU's de-risking policies is essentially securitization.

Among the many channels for the expansion of US-EU policy, the US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) is an important mechanism for the coordination of US-EU policy. Established on 29 September 2021, the TTC is a "2+2" ministerial meeting co-chaired by the United States and the European Union to coordinate paths on key global technical, economic, and trade issues, deepen transatlantic trade and economic ties, and formulate policies based on shared democratic values. As of April 5, 2024, the TTC has held six ministerial meetings and achieved considerable results. As the TTC is described by the United States, it is a policy coordination body between Europe and the United States, so policy transplantation and policy diffusion are the proper meaning of the committee. During six meetings, the US and the EU discussed emerging technology challenges, unfair competition challenges, supply chain dependency issues, and the threat of technology abuse. Policies to strengthen cooperation on emerging technologies, strengthen export controls, conduct investment reviews, protect foreign investment security, resist economic coercion, build resilient semiconductor supply chains, promote sustainability and new opportunities for investment and trade, enhance connectivity and digital infrastructure are considered possible responses. This consensus is also reflected in the EU's European Economic Security Strategy and Five new Initiatives to strengthen European Economic Security, export control, investment review, resistance to economic coercion, leading the development of emerging technologies and

resilient supply chain construction are the core policies of European economic de-risking. Through this policy coordination mechanism, the security policy of the United States has been successfully extended to the economic policy of Europe, and Pan-securitization has become a prominent feature of the RBP of the EU.

CONCLUSION

On the basis of reviewing the security theory, this paper puts forward a theoretical framework about Pan-securitization. Both the Copenhagen School, which emphasizes discursion-driven, and the Paris School, which emphasizes policy practice, are unable to describe the whole picture of Pan-securitization. Only by putting securitization in the perspective of policy process can we better understand the realization of Pan-securitization. This paper holds that discourse narrative mobilization, policy agenda setting and security policy expansion are important mechanisms for the generation and development of Pan-securitization. Using this theoretical framework, we can better understand the Pan-securitization of the EU's RBP. Through the investigation of the EU's de-risking policies, we find that the EU's conflictual narrative of controlling the scope of conflict and attributing causal responsibility has shaped the policy consensus for de-risking policies. On this basis, relevant EU actors strive to promote the concept of de-risking into the policy process and achieve policies; Finally, policy diffusion within and outside the EU further promotes the implementation of de-risking policies.

The EU has successfully realized the Pan-securitization of its RBP by using discourse mobilization, agenda setting and policy expansion, enabling the implementation of its de-risking policies in Europe, but whether this transformation can bring economic resilience to the EU remains to be observed. RBP is a systematic policy response based on risk, which is essentially a scientific approach to risk response. However, when security considerations enter resilience building, the science of resilience policy is replaced by political factors, and RBP is no longer based on risk-responses, but on threat-responses. Therefore, the threat-responses RBP will inevitably faces the constraints of the tension between science and politics, and its policy effect will inevitably be greatly reduced. The EU insists that the implementation of the de-risking policies should be based on a detailed risk examination, but in its policy practice, the EU seems to accept the "decoupling" policy of the United States indiscriminately. The EU itself began to transform from a normative power into a geopolitical power, and Europe became geo-politicized. Therefore, this paper holds that there are obvious differences between the Pan-securitization of RBP and risk-responses RBP. The threat-responses resilience policy is difficult to make up for the vulnerability of countries, and the EU's de-risking policy is also difficult to promote the EU's economic resilience.

REFERENCES

- [1] Austin J. L. (1962). *How to do things with words*, London: Oxford University Press.
- [2] Balzacq T., Léonard S., Ruzicka J. (2016). "Securitization" revisited: theory and cases. *International Relations*, 30(4), 494-531.
- [3] Bourbeau P. (2018). A genealogy of resilience. *International Political Sociology*, 12(1), 19-35.
- [4] Buzan B., Hansen L. (2009). *The evolution of international security studies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- [5] Buzan B., Wæver O., De Wilde J. (1998) *Security: A new framework for analysis*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- [6] Dean M. (2010). *Governmentality: Power and Rule in the Modern Society*, London: Sage.
- [7] Debrix F. (2003). *Language, Nonfoundationalism, International Relations*//Debrix F., ed. *Language, Agency, and Politics in a Constructed World*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharp.
- [8] Didier Bigo D. (2002). *Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease*. *Alternatives*, 27(1), 63-92.
- [9] Foucault M. (1980). *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977*, London: Harvester Press.
- [10] Korosteleva E., Flockhart T. eds. (2020). *Resilience in EU and International Institutions*, London: Routledge.
- [11] Kouhpaenejad, Hossein M., Gholaminejad R. (2014). Identity and language learning from poststructuralist perspective. *Journal of language teaching and research*, 5(1), 199-204.
- [12] Livingston S. G. (1992). The politics of international agenda-setting: Reagan and North-South relations. *International Studies Quarterly*, 36(3), 313-329.
- [13] Martinez-Diaz L. (2018) Investing in resilience today to prepare for tomorrow's climate change. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 74(2), 66-72.
- [14] Miller B. (2001). The Concept of Security: Should it be Redefined. *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 24(2), 13-42.
- [15] Park R E. (1940). News as a Form of Knowledge: A Chapter in the Sociology of Knowledge, *American journal of Sociology*, 45(5), 669-686.
- [16] Scheufele D. A. (2000). Agenda-setting, priming, and framing revisited: Another look at cognitive effects of political communication. *Mass communication & society*, 3(2-3), 297-316.
- [17] Schmidt V A. (2008). Discursive institutionalism: The explanatory power of ideas and discourse. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 11(1), 303-326.
- [18] Shanahan E. A., Jones M. D., McBeth M. K., et al. (2018). The narrative policy framework//Weible C. M., Sabatier

- P. A.. Theories of the policy process. New York: Routledge.
- [19] Tocci N. (2020). Resilience and the role of the European Union in the world//
- [20] Williams M. C. (2003). Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics. *International Studies Quarterly*, 47(4), 511- 531.